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Subgroup deliberation and voting

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Abstract

We consider three mechanisms for the aggregation of information in heterogeneous committees voting by Unanimity rule: Private Voting and voting preceded by either Plenary or Subgroup Deliberation. While the first deliberation protocol imposes public communication, the second restricts communication to homogeneous subgroups. We find that both protocols allow to Pareto improve on outcomes achieved under private voting. Furthermore, we find that when focusing on simple equilibria under Plenary Deliberation, Subgroup Deliberation Pareto improves on outcomes achieved under Plenary Deliberation.

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Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)155–186
Number of pages32
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume45
Issue number1
Early online date12 Feb 2015
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2015
Peer-reviewedYes

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