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Quantifying the deterrent effect of anticartel enforcement

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Quantifying the deterrent effect of anticartel enforcement. / Davies, Stephen; Mariuzzo, Franco; Ormosi, Peter L.

In: Economic Inquiry, Vol. 56, No. 4, 10.2018, p. 1933-1949.

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@article{051a5679a9a44176af576cef41aaedff,
title = "Quantifying the deterrent effect of anticartel enforcement",
abstract = "This paper presents a rare attempt to quantify the deterrent effect of anti-cartel policy. It develops a conceptual framework, which establishes the sort of information necessary for such quantification. This is then illustrated and calibrated by drawing upon existing literatures and using evidence from legal cartels to approximate what would be observed absent policy. Measuring impact by the proportion of all potential harm that is deterred, our best estimate is two thirds and, even on conservative assumptions, at least half of all harms (or seven times the detected harm) is deterred.",
keywords = "anti-competitive harm, cartels, detection, deterrence, Monte Carlo stimulation, selection bias",
author = "Stephen Davies and Franco Mariuzzo and Ormosi, {Peter L.}",
year = "2018",
month = oct,
doi = "10.1111/ecin.12574",
language = "English",
volume = "56",
pages = "1933--1949",
journal = "Economic Inquiry",
issn = "0095-2583",
publisher = "Wiley",
number = "4",

}

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TY - JOUR

T1 - Quantifying the deterrent effect of anticartel enforcement

AU - Davies, Stephen

AU - Mariuzzo, Franco

AU - Ormosi, Peter L.

PY - 2018/10

Y1 - 2018/10

N2 - This paper presents a rare attempt to quantify the deterrent effect of anti-cartel policy. It develops a conceptual framework, which establishes the sort of information necessary for such quantification. This is then illustrated and calibrated by drawing upon existing literatures and using evidence from legal cartels to approximate what would be observed absent policy. Measuring impact by the proportion of all potential harm that is deterred, our best estimate is two thirds and, even on conservative assumptions, at least half of all harms (or seven times the detected harm) is deterred.

AB - This paper presents a rare attempt to quantify the deterrent effect of anti-cartel policy. It develops a conceptual framework, which establishes the sort of information necessary for such quantification. This is then illustrated and calibrated by drawing upon existing literatures and using evidence from legal cartels to approximate what would be observed absent policy. Measuring impact by the proportion of all potential harm that is deterred, our best estimate is two thirds and, even on conservative assumptions, at least half of all harms (or seven times the detected harm) is deterred.

KW - anti-competitive harm

KW - cartels

KW - detection

KW - deterrence

KW - Monte Carlo stimulation

KW - selection bias

U2 - 10.1111/ecin.12574

DO - 10.1111/ecin.12574

M3 - Article

VL - 56

SP - 1933

EP - 1949

JO - Economic Inquiry

JF - Economic Inquiry

SN - 0095-2583

IS - 4

ER -

ID: 129170789