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Group Behaviour in Tacit Coordination Games with Focal Points: An Experimental Investigation

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Abstract

This paper reports an experimental investigation of Schelling’s theory of focal points that compares group and individual behaviour. We find that, when players’ interests are perfectly aligned, groups more often choose the salient option and achieve higher coordination success than individuals. However, in games with conflicts of interest, groups do not always perform better than individuals, especially when the degree of conflict is substantial. We also find that groups outperform individuals when identifying the solution to the coordination problem requires some level of cognitive sophistication. Finally, players that successfully identify the solution to this game also achieve greater coordination rates than other players in games with a low degree of conflict. This result raises the question of whether finding the focal point is more a matter of logic rather than imagination as Schelling argued.

Details

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-44
Number of pages44
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Early online date9 Aug 2019
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 9 Aug 2019
Peer-reviewedYes

Keywords

    Research areas

  • Groups, Coordination, Payoff-irrelevant cues, cognition

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