Early Settlement in European Merger Control

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We analyse the determinants of early settlement between merging parties and the European Commission over remedies that remove concerns of anticompetitive effects. This extends the previously narrow range of econometric literature on early settlement. Consistent with the theory of early settlement, our results confirm the importance of delay costs and of uncertainty, measured by the complexity of the economic analysis required for each merger. We also find a non-monotonic effect of agency resourcing, which raises questions about the Commission's efficiency in times of high case load. Econometrically, we select a sample of merger decisions in which the European Commission intervened due to concerns of anticompetitive effects, and our selection model provides estimates of the factors determining intervention by the Commission. Conclusions are drawn for public policy.


Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)27-63
Number of pages37
JournalJournal of Industrial Economics
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2016

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. © 2016 The Authors Journal of Industrial Economics published by Editorial Board and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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