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Consistency and communication in committees

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Abstract

We generalize the classical binary Condorcet jury model by introducing a richer state and signal space, thereby generating a concern for consistency in the evaluation of aggregate information. We analyze truth-telling incentives in simultaneous pre-vote communication in heterogeneous committees and find that full pooling of information followed by sincere voting is compatible with a positive probability of ex post conflict in the committee.

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Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)24-35
Number of pages12
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume160
Early online date29 Aug 2015
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2015
Peer-reviewedYes

Keywords

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  • Committees, Voting, Information aggregation, Cheap talk

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ID: 108595210

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