HomePublications

Agreements with Reciprocity: Co-financing and MOUs

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Documents

  • Accepted manuscript

    Accepted author manuscript, 446 KB, PDF-document

    Embargo ends: 18/12/19

  • Accepted manuscript

    Accepted author manuscript, 371 KB, PDF-document

    Embargo ends: 31/12/99

  • Online appendix

    Accepted author manuscript, 202 KB, PDF-document

    Embargo ends: 31/12/99

DOI

Authors

Organisational units

Abstract

Institutions for co-financing agreements often exist to encourage public good investment. Can such frameworks deliver maximal investment when agents are motivated by reciprocity? We demonstrate that indeed they can, but not how one might expect. If maximal investment is impossible in the absence of the institution and public good returns are high, then an agreement signed by all parties cannot lead to full investment. However, if all parties reject the agreement, then full investment is attainable via a gentlemen's agreement or memorandum of understanding (MOU). Agreement institutions may thus do more than just facilitate the signing of binding agreements; they may play a critical role in igniting informal cooperation underpinned by reciprocity.

Details

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)85-99
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume111
Early online date18 Jun 2018
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2018
Peer-reviewedYes

Keywords

    Research areas

  • Co-financing agreements, Gentlemens' agreements, MOUs, Public goods, Reciprocity

View graph of relations

ID: 136353762

Related by author
  1. Introduction to Special Issue on Psychological Game Theory

    Research output: Contribution to journalEditorial

  2. Guilt and participation

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

  3. Reciprocity networks and the participation problem

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

  4. How category reporting can improve fundraising

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Related by journal
  1. Focal points and payoff information in tacit bargaining

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

  2. Endogenous incentive contracts and efficient coordination

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

  3. Balanced externalities and the Shapley value

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle